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This paper is an attempt to explore some of the critiques of conflict resolution that 
have appeared in the academic literature during the past few years. In essence the 
thrust of these criticisms amount to serious questions about the capability of outsiders 
(and especially those intervening from the West) to influence and secure peace 
processes by negotiation and agreement. Indeed, it has been argued that attempts at 
impartial intervention can actually fuel and  prolong war and its miseries.  Linked to 
this kind of criticism is the idea either that the Western model of conflict resolution 
(promoted through the UN, for example) is fundamentally flawed. This is so because 
it is inadequate in both its analysis of the causes and dynamics of contemporary armed 
conflict, and in the prescriptions that follow from this analysis.    
 
Three critiques in particular, presented by David Shearer, Christopher Clapham, and 
Mark Duffield, are considered. They  raise serious issues about the nature of conflict 
resolution, and it is important that they be responded to for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, they tend to imply that force becomes the arbiter of change. Secondly, they 
may also encourage inactivity and  paralysis in the face of what are perceived to be 
overwhelmingly powerful forces of global structural change, on which we can have no 
influence.  Thirdly,  they make very little reference to the literature on conflict 
resolution and, therefore, dismiss or are ignorant of perspectives coming from this 
literature. These perspectives do not provide such a negative view of the ability of  the 
international community to intervene effectively in conflicts, guided by an impartial 
humanitarian concern for the victims of conflict.   Fourthly,  there has been a 
proliferation of ‘non-official’ conflict resolution organisations in the last ten years or 
so whose work in areas of  conflict throughout the world has been built upon 
principles of non-violent peacemaking. This practice of non-violent conflict resolution 
provides the basis for  a global ‘peace praxis’,  that is the development of skills, 
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processes and resources necessary to sustain and develop cultures of peace. This 
dimension of practice is also largely ignored by our critics.  
 
In the first section of this paper I will consider three critics of conflict resolution and,  
in the middle section, argue that they have inaccurately or superficially represented the 
significance of conflict resolution theory and practice.  This is so firstly  in relation to 
lessons learned about the use of force and the relationship between UN peacekeeping 
and conflict resolution; secondly in relation to the supposed assumptions of the 
conflict resolution field about the nature of conflict; and thirdly in relation to the 
nature of third party roles, and the dynamics of peacebuilding from below. The 
response to critics comes in section 3 (on the use of force and the development of 
peacekeeping); in section 4, (restoring harmony or negotiating change? the role of 
third parties); and in section 5 (restoring peace with justice, peacebuilding from 
below).  In conclusion it is argued that conflict resolution has moved beyond reliance 
on a western model and has become a global practice. Difficult judgements remain to 
be made about the relationship between conflict resolution and the use of force, and 
about the relationships between outsiders and local peacemakers. Yet if the project of 
finding alternatives to the misery of war is a significant one for the international 
community, the work of those who identify themselves as theorists and practitioners 
of conflict resolution cannot be lightly discounted. 
 
2. Three Critics 
 
The first critic to consider is David Shearer (1997).  He argues that attempts to resolve 
conflicts in the 1990s are based on different assumptions than those that dominated 
the Cold War era. Now the stress is on promoting multi-track efforts to reach 
agreements in civil wars by negotiation, consensus and compromise, whereas 
conventionally, western policy was targeted at promoting victory by one side or 
another in civil wars. Shearer, reflecting  on events in Sierra Leone, questions whether 
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the consensus promoting strategy, based on impartial mediation and negotiation by the 
international community, is appropriate in all cases. In particular, he suggests that 
what have been typified as ‘war lord insurgencies’ may be especially resistant to 
resolution by consent and negotiation. In these situations, the role of military force in 
the resolution of conflict may need to be better understood.  
 
The implications of these and similar arguments can be seen as a direct challenge to 
some of the core assumptions and approaches of conflict resolution, which in this 
analytical perspective are perceived to be ineffective, lacking in prescriptive 
guidelines for policy-makers, and even positively harmful. This is so because the 
pursuit of mediated settlements can have the unintended effect of  prolonging the 
conflict, with civilian populations suffering most, while military action might have the 
effect of foreshortening the conflict by persuading those losing ground to accept a 
settlement. Citing Stedman and Licklider, Shearer observes that in civil wars, in 
general, most settlements followed a military victory rather than political negotiations 
or mediated interventions. Shearer is not advocating military action rather than 
consent based conflict resolution, but rather pointing to the need to examine carefully 
and to understand more about the limits (and possibilities) of consent-based strategies.  
This is given further urgency at a time when there may be an implicit move by states 
in the direction of preferring conflict settlement by force (even to the extent of 
contracting the services of specialised mercenary forces).  
 
Christopher Clapham (1998), based on an examination of the conflict in Rwanda, adds  
further words of warning about western conflict resolution assumptions.  Like 
Shearer, he suggests that in recent years the international community has been actively 
involved in intervening in civil wars and has, in the process of this intervention, 
articulated a standardised conflict resolution mechanism that has been universally 
applied. Clapham argues that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the victors 
of the cold war (that is, Western capitalist liberal democratic states led by the USA, as 
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well as NGOs and international agencies often funded by those states) set about a 
programme of international conflict resolution.  These programmes followed 
processes and rules made in the image of these victorious institutions. The processes 
and rules of the post-Cold War approach are quite different from those that guided 
Cold War policy which gave a privileged place in conflict resolution to sovereign 
states, and to the territorial integrity and the non-intervention norms that are 
associated with them.  State structures were to be kept intact, and the only movements 
that challenged existing state structures with some legitimacy were those involved in 
liberation struggles against colonial regimes.  
 
Post-Cold War, the special status of states was diluted. All parties to a conflict were 
accorded a ‘standing’, and the break up of the Soviet Union meant that secession and 
independence from existing states became a recognised form of conflict resolution. 
The inviolability of state sovereignty was challenged, as democratic values and 
respect for human rights became part of the international humanitarian value system, 
and opposition groups, claiming to be victims of state repression, could be admitted to 
peacemaking processes on terms broadly equal to state authorities. Following this 
change in standing of conflict parties, a new model of conflict resolution was 
indicated. Cease-fires were negotiated to provide space and time for an agreed peace 
settlement; the peace agreement was in turn tied to a process of third party mediation, 
which itself carried the values of  Western liberal democracy.    
 
The basic model of conflict resolution to emerge from this had two variants or 
mechanisms through which a  peace agreement was to be fashioned. In one variant of 
the model the parties negotiated an agreed constitution (based on multi-party 
democracy and respect for human rights) followed by elections under international 
supervision (Angola and Mozambique in the early 1990s).  In the second variant a 
provisional coalition government is formed to introduce a series of confidence 
building measures (disarmament under international supervision), which would make 
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it possible to agree a new constitution, and then to have multi-party elections 
(attempted in Somalia and Liberia). In most cases, where variants one and two of the 
model have been used, international peacekeeping forces were used to supervise the 
peace process. In Rwanda, variant two of the model was applied, with disastrous 
consequences. Extremist parties, who were committed to an ideology of Hutu 
exclusivism, used the Arusha peace process, which was being managed by the 
international community, as a cover and during a phase when they effectively 
organised the genocide that occurred in April 1994.  
 
In advancing this argument, Christopher Clapham does not claim that he is offering a 
general critique of conflict resolution, nor does he offer guidelines for policy in 
general.  He does suggest that, based on what happened in Rwanda, we might be wise 
to exercise much more caution in our use of intervention strategies in civil wars.  His 
fundamental point is that the conflict resolution model may be inherently flawed, its 
rules and prescriptions taken for granted. Reflecting on the Rwanda experience, what 
were the flaws in the peacemaking strategy? The approach did not recognise the need 
for the resolution of the deep-seated differences that caused the conflict. The timescale 
for effecting the peace process was short. The approach was mechanistic, and ignored 
the need to fashion a basic political agreement that rested on the support of key actors 
who shared at least some commitment to ideological norms, necessary to underpin the 
peace process. In relation to the latter point, Clapham raises a profound question about 
the ‘western’ assumptions built into the model, principally in the idea that the viability 
of negotiated solutions to civil wars rests on the assumption that conflict parties share 
a common value framework, within which differences can be negotiated. In Rwanda, 
says Clapham, this idea was ‘fundamentally misconceived’, and even in western 
culture it is a relatively new assumption historically, with most major conflicts from 
the 16th century onwards fought to a conclusion, either with a victor emerging or with 
mutual exhaustion resulting in a compromise settlement.  A second assumption in the 
model that was not challenged was the idea that mediation is inherently a good thing, 
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being a neutral action and intended to fulfil humanitarian concerns. In reality 
mediators are not neutral by-standers, and in Rwanda they may have created 
conditions which allowed extremists groups to organise genocide, while they (the 
mediators) were pursuing a negotiated settlement to which the Hutu extremists would 
not have subscribed.  Eventually, the war in Rwanda was ended, not by the three and a 
half years of international mediation, but by the military victory of the RPF.   
 
In the aftermath of the war, as the new RPF regime attempted to establish control over  
the country, large numbers of NGOs arrived,  as part of a major international response, 
to provide humanitarian assistance. Clapham raises significant questions about their 
role and impact. He raises three areas of concern. Firstly, that they adopted a victim 
complex, seeing all the refugees in the camps in Zaire and Tanzania as victims of the 
conflict, when many of the camps were controlled by the extremists responsible for 
the genocide. Secondly, they developed a juridical complex, following western legal 
norms about trial and punishment, when these norms could not be implemented in 
Rwandan conditions.  Thirdly, they carried a reconciliation complex, where some 
NGOs promoted rehabilitation of individuals implicated in genocide, again, according 
to Clapham, of limited applicability to the situation in Rwanda. At this level also, 
therefore, ‘the application to African conflicts of the values of Western civil societies’ 
gave rise to problems, adding further force to the idea that the appropriateness of the 
Western conflict resolution model needs to be more extensively examined.  
 
Another influential critic of the assumptions of methods of conflict resolution is Mark 
Duffield. Duffield has argued that rather than being an aberrant, irrational and non-
productive phenomenon, contemporary internal wars may represent ‘the emergence of 
entirely new types of social formation adapted for survival on the margins of the 
global economy’ (Duffield, 1997, 100). Actors like the international drug cartels in 
Central and South America, and rebel groups in West Africa, have effectively set up 
parallel economies, trading in precious resources such as hardwoods, diamonds, drugs 
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and so on. Although this does not apply to all internal conflicts, there are war zone 
economies where civilians are seen as ‘a resource base to be either corralled, 
plundered, or cleansed’ (Duffield, 1997, 103). Humanitarian and development aid is 
captured, and humanitarian workers kidnapped, held hostage and killed. These wars 
can be seen to be both lucrative and rational for those who can take advantage and are 
prepared to act violently to gain power.  
 
Conflict resolution projects in this critique can be seen as part of a  ‘delegitimising 
discourse’ which has enabled Western regulation of third world politics. (Duffield,  
98).   Duffield and Clapham’s critiques overlap at this point. With the collapse of 
‘Third worldism’ and of ‘international socialism’, the liberal-democratic model of 
capitalist development has emerged unchallenged in the 1990s.  The implications of 
this for the political settlement of conflicts has already been pointed to by Clapham. 
For Duffield, in the field of development, it means that inequality, economic growth 
and resource distribution are issues that have been sidelined in favour of  the ‘human 
development’ paradigm in the 1990s (Duffield, p. 80).  This largely involves securing 
‘behavioural and attitudinal change’,  so that people can  ‘cope with their situation’ 
and be supported in ‘mitigating the risks and stresses involved’ (Duffield p. 80). Thus 
underdevelopment, and more recently transitions to democracy, have been 
‘internalised’, that is seen as issues of the internal, domestic relations of the countries 
concerned. The process of change then becomes one of supporting behavioural change 
in civil society in conflict afflicted countries. In pursuit of this goal, aid has been 
privatised, NGOs have become the main agents of change, and conflict resolution 
‘represents an extreme form of this paradigm.’ (Duffield, p. 80) 
 
For Duffield, the whole approach of conflict resolution is questionable because of the 
assumptions on which it is grounded. Conflict resolution, he claims, ‘is based on a 
socio-psychological model’.  This model assumes that functional harmony is the 
natural state, and conflict is an aberrant and irrational condition which is 
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dysfunctional. The model also assumes that the origins of conflict lie in localised 
misunderstandings, ignorance and disagreements that may then lead to war. Conflict 
resolving interventions are intended to remove misunderstandings and restore 
functional harmony through a number of strategies: 
 
Firstly the use of  multi-track diplomacy to energise a peace process through the efforts 
of international, regional, national and local actors. The end goal of the peace process 
is ‘a strong, plural civil society.’ (Duffield Report, 95).  
 
Secondly, plural institutions are encouraged by small-scale resource distribution to 
encourage co-operation on joint projects, by the promotion of multicultural projects, 
and so on.  
 
Thirdly, the use of ‘psychological interventions’ directed towards re-establishing 
confidence and trust between groups. These interventions occur through conferences, 
workshops and programmes of training in conflict resolution skills designed to 
provide ‘psychological and inter-personal tools for defusing potentially tense 
situations’. (Duffield, 97) 
 
Duffield has a number of specific criticisms and problems with the model, which may 
be summarised as follows. Firstly, the way in which conflict resolution training 
provides ‘concentrated immersion within the socio-psychological model of conflict’, 
can look more like indoctrination than training.  Secondly, the concentration on 
communications breakdowns and individual failings means that all people in conflict 
situations are as bad as each other. All are victims. This means that, in effect, the 
perpetrators of political violence are absolved from blame (peace is placed above 
justice in the model), and that in any case they rarely participate in the conferences 
and training prescribed by the model.  Conflict resolution training does not impress 
Mark Duffield, presenting ‘little threat to those in power’; providing Western donors 
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with  a cheap means of ‘doing something’ in conflict situations; and even because it 
may be conducted by ‘people who are without professional qualifications’ (Duffield, 
97).  Finally, he has linked conflict resolution, together with aid and human 
development programmes, with a critique which sees Western intervention generally 
as a new form of imperialism, where ‘Western humanitarian and liberal democratic 
discourse has the effect of disqualifying local political projects as inadequate or 
lacking’ (Duffield, 98).  In Africa, NGOs have undermined local capabilities and have 
‘made matters worse’.  
 
It is not the intention in this paper to take on the task of replying to all of these 
criticisms, point by point. To a large extent, they amount to a concern about three core 
areas. Firstly, on the use of force (raised by Shearer and Clapham). Secondly, on the 
nature of the Western and interventionist motivations behind the conflict resolution 
model (in Clapham and Duffield). Thirdly, on the prescriptions for action which come 
from the model, which are based, it is alleged, on a misunderstanding of conflict 
especially by western NGOs (in Clapham and Duffield). These questions are 




3 On the use of force and the development of peacekeeping 
 
 Shearer pointed out that intervention might prolong the misery and suffering of civil 
wars by unintentionally prolonging the conflict.  However, as he recognises, the costs 
of military enforcement or victory by one side over another may be as high, or higher, 
than political intervention. In some cases (Somalia), it did not work (Duffey, 1998).  
In others where it did work, the winning side has gone on to commit genocide against 
the defeated. There is in short no such thing as a military ‘quick fix’.  In answer to 
Shearer’s question, the humanitarian imperative (the need to apply internationally 
agreed humanitarian standards) compels that serious and sustained attention be given 
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to understanding the processes and circumstances by which the conclusions of conflict 
resolution approaches can be operationalised. The point is not to encourage victory by 
one side, in cases where civilian populations on both sides have become the targets of 
combatants, but to link forceful intervention, which is internationally legitimised, with 
consent-based strategies, to develop a politically sustainable solution. Thus  robust 
peacekeeping (with a capacity to enforce  international agreements, and to apply 
human rights standards, especially for non-combatants), linked to conflict resolution 
mechanisms, is a clear policy option for the international community, and it is one 
which is emerging from assessments made post-1994 Rwanda and post-1993 Somalia. 
Amongst the most comprehensive assessments of the 1994 catastrophe has been the 
Joint Evaluation conducted at the instigation of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and its development wing, Danida (Eriksson, 1996). Oxfam has also produced a 
concise and carefully focused analysis of the response of the international community 
to the Rwanda crisis (Vassall Adams, 1994). For example, Vassall Adams concludes 
that, while primary responsibility for the genocide lay with extremist groups inside 
Rwanda, the international community (specifically the major powers) was culpable by 
failing to respond effectively. These and other evaluations suggested that a major 
reform of the UN, both in its peacekeeping role and in its humanitarian capacity, was 
needed (Whitman and Pocock, 1996; UN, 1996). For the future, Vassall Adams 
suggests that the UN form an Office of Preventive Diplomacy in order to be better 
able to respond to emerging conflicts; that UN peacekeeping be reformed including 
better preparation for early and rapid deployment of forces; that the efforts of 
civilian/humanitarian agencies be better co-ordinated both among themselves and 
with the military; and that arms flows to conflict areas should be much more strictly 
controlled and regulated through the UN’s Register of Conventional Arms (and 
should cover small arms and land mines, in particular to governments or groups which 
violate the basic human rights of their citizens). The Joint Evaluation study found that 
the NGO response to the crisis was mixed, with criticisms directed at the duplication 
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and waste of resources and at some examples of unprofessional and irresponsible 
conduct (Eriksson, 1996, III, 152-153, 59-60).  
The decision by the Security Council to reduce its peacekeeping force in Rwanda to a 
minimum once the Belgian contingent was withdrawn is seen to be precisely the 
reverse of what should have been done. The ability of the small rump force left behind 
in Kigali to protect thousands of civilians during the period of the genocide indicates 
that the caution about peacekeeping, which resulted from experience in Somalia, 
should be reviewed and a renewed commitment to peacekeeping made. UN 
peacekeeping forces, mandated to protect civilians and to provide the security 
necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid, are an important part of the conflict 
resolution process in war zones, providing the platform from which political and 
humanitarian spaces can be maintained even under the most extreme pressures. This 
means, in the short term, much more positive support by those UN member states with 
the greatest military capacity to provide expertise, training, logistical support and 
finance for deploying UN peacekeepers under existing stand-by arrangements. For the 
longer term, both the Oxfam study and the Joint Evaluation recommended that UN 
peacekeeping capability should be strengthened by the creation of a rapid deployment 
force, either directly under UN control, or, with UN support, under the control of 
regional organisations such as the OAU and the OAS (Vassall Adams, 1994, 60; 
Eriksson, 1996, 48).  Both reports also called for a ‘harder’ concept of peacekeeping 
which nevertheless belongs within the category of non-coercive forms of conflict 
management, through the definition of standard operating procedures for UN 
peacekeeping missions, enabling and resourcing them to protect civilians threatened 
by political violence (Woodhouse 1998).   
In recent years we can observe a tendency by  experienced peace-keepers to call for 
the integration of conflict resolution mechanisms in their policy-making and 
operational practices. It is noticeable, for example, how much of the peacekeeping 
doctrine of the British Army, elaborated in Wider Peacekeeping, is suffused with the 
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language of conflict resolution (Wider Peacekeeping, 1995). The same approach is 
taken in American doctrine covering peace support operations (Chayer and Raach, 
1995). Here, the managing of consent (based on the principles of impartiality, 
legitimacy, mutual respect, minimum force, credibility, and transparency) is related to 
the techniques of promoting good communication, of negotiation and mediation, and 
of positive approaches to community relations through an active civil affairs 
programme which is amply resourced to win 'hearts and minds'.  The development of 
such an approach to conflict resolution provides some prospect for developing 
intervention strategies which do attempt to address the deeper causes of conflicts, and 
this is a clear and preferable alternative for the international community than the role 
of passive observer in the face of violation of humanitarian standards, which may be 
implied by aspects of Clapham’s and Duffield’s critique. Over the past few years there 
have been innovative efforts to combine military peacekeeping with conflict 
resolution strategies. These efforts are reviewed below. 
 
John Mackinlay sees the concepts and doctrine which defined classical peacekeeping 
as no longer adequate to cope with the demands placed on peace-keepers in the civil 
wars into which they have been drawn in the 1990s. Nevertheless, while he argues for 
broadened and strengthened forms of peacekeeping, he still maintains that consent is 
the major precondition for the success of peace support operations. In a redefinition of 
British peacekeeping doctrine beyond Wider Peacekeeping, Philip Wilkinson also 
expands the range of action to include a possible greater use of force, citing 
impartiality rather than consent as the key determinant in distinguishing forcible 
peacekeeping from war. But he, too, continues to see the nurturing and building of 
consent within the wider peace constituency as an essential aim. In particular, he 
identifies six different sets of techniques designed to maintain consent in conflict 
areas where peacekeepers are deployed and which are particularly important because 
‘the military element’s presence in the operational area does not always inspire local 
support for them. For this reason, land forces will have to spend more time and effort, 
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down to the individual level, in consent promoting activity’ (Wilkinson, 1996, 168). 
The six techniques are related to: (a) negotiation and mediation; (b) liaison; (c) 
civilian affairs; (d) community information; (e) public information; and (f) community 
relations. The objective of this kind of activity is to provide good information in order 
to reduce rumour, uncertainty and prejudice on the one hand, and to foster trust and 
stability in the area of conflict and positive perceptions of the role of peacekeepers and 
the nature of the peace process, on the other.   
 
A further example of the use of conflict resolution theory in relation to peacekeeping 
is in the work of David Last, a Canadian officer with experience in the UNFICYP 
(Cyprus) and UNPROFOR operations. Last set out to review the contribution of 
peacekeeping to conflict resolution as practised in the past; he also wished to identify 
'what new techniques may be used to help peacekeepers work more actively with 
civilians to eliminate violent conflict': 
 
To argue by analogy, I believe the situation of peacekeepers today is much like 
the situation of commanders on the Western Front in 1916, who were bogged 
down in defensive operations. To push the analogy somewhat, new tools of 
war were becoming available to commanders in 1916 that would permit them 
to take the offensive if they could only adjust their thinking about how to use 
their forces. In the same way, new techniques of peacekeeping, taken from 
conflict resolution theory and civilian experience, now permit peacekeepers to 
take the offensive to restore peace (Last, 1997, 129). 
 
The integration of the operational and practical aspects of approaches from conflict 
resolution, and at this level of detail, into the processes of peacekeeping in the field is 
still at a somewhat unsystematic and rudimentary stage, but the requirement is now 
quite widely recognised. 
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Finally, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has pointed to the need for 
peacekeeping forces to find new capabilities for what he refers to as positive 
inducements to gain support for peacekeeping mandates amongst populations in 
conflict zones. Reliance on coercion alone is insufficient, he argues, because, while 
peacekeeping forces in the future will need to have a greater coercive capacity, the 
effect of coercion will erode over time. It is better, therefore, to attempt to influence 
the behaviour of people in conflict situations by the use of the carrot rather than the 
stick. Thus while coercion can restrain violence at least temporarily, it cannot promote 
lasting peace; a durable peace and a lasting solution require not only stopping the 
violence but, crucially, ‘taking the next step’. For Annan, taking the next step means 
offering positive incentives or inducements.  Peacekeeping forces, in other words, 
need to be able to make available rewards in the mission area. Annan defines two  
broad categories of reward. 
 
The first is what some military establishments have called 'civic action'. Its 
purpose is limited, namely to gain the good will and consequent cooperation of 
the population. The second, which might be termed 'peace incentives', is more 
ambitious. It is intended as leverage to further the reconciliation process. It 
provides incentives - a structure of rewards - for erstwhile antagonists to 
cooperate with each other on some endeavour, usually a limited one at first, 
which has the potential for expansion if all goes well. 
 
 
This concept, which Annan sees as absolutely essential for the future effectiveness of 
peacekeeping operations brings peacekeeping squarely into the realm of conflict 
resolution as defined above.  
 
To employ them [positive inducements/rewards] effectively as tools of conflict 
resolution requires understanding peoples' problems in their complexity and 
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being able to respond at several levels simultaneously and with a certain 
amount of flexibility ... 
 
Civic action, in short, is neither charity nor luxury but, in the types of conflicts 
we have been discussing, an essential requirement for operational 
effectiveness that requires a line item of its own in the peace operation's 
budget. Peace incentives, similarly, are rewards-cum-leverage rather than 
assistance for its own sake. (Annan, 1997, 27-28) 
   
Working in conflict zones thus becomes a complex process of balancing coercive 
inducements with positive inducements; of  supplementing military containment and 
humanitarian relief roles; and of promoting civic action to rebuild communities 
economically, politically and socially. A wide range of actors and agencies, military 
and civilian, governmental and non-governmental, indigenous and external, therefore 
constitute the conflict resolution capability in war zones. Simultaneous activities are 
targeted on broadening the security, humanitarian, political, and development spaces 
in which peace processes can take root.  In this complicated arena the issue of the co-
ordination of multi-agency activity becomes paramount. Once again the Rwanda 
evaluations agree in essence about the nature of required reforms: the Joint Evaluation 
report recommended the formation of a Humanitarian Sub-Committee of the Security 
Council, tasked to synthesise crisis information; to oversee the integration of political, 
military and humanitarian objectives; and to create an integrated UN line of command 
between UN headquarters and the field, and within the field. Vassall Adams suggests 
that this co-ordination might be secured by the creation of a new UN Department 
which would incorporate the Department for Humanitarian Affairs and all the 
disparate agencies involved in responding to emergencies (Eriksson, 1996, 47-48: 
Vassall Adams, 1994, 66). At the field level post-conflict evaluations are also yielding 
consistent recommendations. For Dallaire, the UNAMIR force commander in 
Rwanda, it is vital that co-ordination mechanisms be improved by the creation of a 
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UN multi-disciplinary team of senior crisis managers, and that there should be regular 
meetings between the UN and NGOs through civil-military operations centres 
(CMOCs). From this should emerge a culture of understanding between the various 
agencies, leading in turn to better defined standard operating procedures. In Dallaire’s 
view, too, an interdisciplinary UN-led crisis management and humanitarian assistance 
centre is needed (Dallaire, 1996, 216). Speaking of the various agencies of the 
international community, whether they are primarily concerned with opening up 
security, humanitarian, or political spaces, Dallaire said: ‘we are intertwined by the 
very nature of the crisis .… Clearly, peacekeeping cannot be an end in itself - it only 
buys time. In its goals and its design, it must always be a part of the larger continuum 
of peace-making, that is to say conflict avoidance, resolution, rehabilitation and 
development’ (Dallaire, 1996, 217).  
 
Similar conclusions were made from Somalia. Drawing on his experience as the UN 
Secretary General’s Special Representative in Somalia, and as Deputy Secretary-
General of the OAU,  Mohamed Sahnoun  proposed a new international institution for 
conflict management. Its role would be to ‘mobilise all approaches to conflict 
resolution and ... increase communications and networks among different 
communities in local conflict areas through the integrated efforts of NGOs and the 
United Nations’ (Aall, 1996, 441). The main challenge for such an institution would 
be to overcome well-founded objections to 'interventionary humanitarianism' from 
countries of the South on the one hand, and reluctance to be drawn into conflict zones 
unless clear national interests were involved on the part of powerful, mainly Western, 
governments on the other.  In sum, the effort of conflict resolution research is focused 
on the challenge of  strengthening the institutions of the international community to 
resolve civil wars non-violently. Of course there are many areas of concern related to 
new concepts and practices of peacekeeping, not least the question of how effectively 
military forces can be re-oriented to peacemaking roles, and how they relate to civilian 
agencies in areas of conflict. (Slim, 1997?).  Yet it  is by no means the case that the 
only lesson learned from Rwanda is for the international community to be uninvolved 
in such conflicts. 
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4. The Role of  Third Party Intervention. Restoring harmony, or negotiating 
change?   
 
 
It is healthy and productive to urge caution about the effectiveness of  third party 
intervention into internal and civil wars, based on clearly authoritative knowledge of 
specific cases such as Shearer has of Sierra Leone and Clapham of Rwanda. However,  
as with the argument about the use of force in conflict resolution considered above, 
there are also different conclusions which can be drawn about the political role of 
third parties in such conflicts. There are many useful case studies and an extensive 
literature on the effects of third party intervention, by both official and unofficial 
actors.  It is not the intention to review all this here, but to highlight some significant 
findings from this literature which does not concur with the negative assessments of 
Shearer, Clapham, and Duffield. Hume’s study of Mozambique, the work of  Fitzduff, 
Bloomfield, Darby, and others in Northern Ireland, Corbin’s account of the role of the 
Norwegians in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, Yarrow’s account of Quaker 
mediation, are just a few examples of positive appraisals of third party roles. A recent 
work by Hampson looks at the roles of a variety of third parties and the way in which 
they inter-relate to re-enforce each other in a sustained effort not only to make peace 
agreements but equally important to sustain them in the long run.  The substance of 
his book consists in five case studies: Cyprus, Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, and 
Cambodia. In essence, Hampson’s conclusion is that peace settlements  are not self 
executing, but that they are sustained best by the work of third parties, external actors 
who use combined mediation, problem-solving and peacebuilding strategies. These 
third parties are crucial, providing the cement to hold things together and providing 
the creativity, incentives and pressure needed to prevent the parties in conflict from 
running aground.  The analysis is both realistic and optimistic: third party intervention 
following non-violent principles and conflict resolution strategies can work, even if 
success may be partial and failures may dominate.   
 
While we can point to a literature which allows us to draw perhaps more optimistic 
conclusions about the nature and effectiveness of third party intervention, we are still 
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faced with serious aspects of  Clapham’s and Duffield’s critiques. Both writers as we 
have seen have problems with the model. For Clapham, these problems lie in the 
Western assumptions built into it, its mechanistic application and short time scale, and 
its failure to recognise the deep seated differences which led to the conflict. Duffield 
is less concerned about third party mediation conducted at the level of official 
diplomacy, than about the deficiencies of the model when applied by NGOs.  For him 
both the analysis of conflict is wrong (the assumption that harmony is the natural 
state); and the prescription for action which from this (based on a socio-psychological 
intervention strategy) leads to a ‘delegitimising’ discourse. It is argued below that 
there is much in both the theory and the practice of conflict resolution which suggests 
that it has responded creatively to  these kinds of critiques and that it remains a 
relevant field of enquiry and practice.   
 
Mark Duffield’s claim that conflict resolution is based on a socio-psychological model 
which assumes an underlying functional harmony as a natural state is not an accurate 
characterisation, and is derived from one report which itself is severely limited in its 
knowledge of the conflict resolution literature (Voutira and Brown, 1995).  It is true 
that some NGOs may be better at analysis and use of theory than others, but not all 
would agree that ‘harmony’ is a natural or even a desirable state. Power imbalances in 
socio-economic structures are very much part of conflict resolution analysis. For 
example, thirty years ago Johan Galtung (1969; 1996, 72) proposed an influential 
model of conflict, suggesting that it be viewed as a triangle, with contradiction (C), 
attitude (A) and behaviour (B) at its vertices. Here the contradiction refers to the 
underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived 'incompatibility 
of goals' between the conflict parties generated by what Chris Mitchell refers to as a 
mis-match between social values and social structure. 
 
Galtung argues that all three components have to be present together in a full conflict. 
A conflict structure without conflictual attitudes or behaviour is a latent (or 
‘structural') conflict. Galtung sees conflict as a dynamic process in which structure, 
attitudes and behaviour are constantly changing and influencing one another. As a 
conflict emerges, it becomes a conflict formation as parties’ interests come into 
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conflict or the  relationship they are in becomes oppressive. Conflict parties then 
organize around this structure to pursue their interests. They develop hostile attitudes 
and conflictual behaviour. And so the conflict formation starts to grow and develop. 
As it does so, it may widen, drawing in other parties, deepen, and spread, generating 
secondary conflicts within the main parties or among outsiders who get sucked in. 
This often considerably complicates the task of addressing the original, core conflict. 
Eventually, however, resolving the conflict must involve a set of dynamic changes 
that involve de-esclation of conflict behaviour, change in attitudes, and transforming 
the relationships or clashing interests that are at the core of the conflict structure.  
Neither does conflict resolution regard harmony and order as a natural or even 
desirable state. Rather, conflict is seen as a necessary and inevitable component of 
social change.  Galtung (1981) also draws the distinction between direct violence 
(children are murdered), structural violence (children die through poverty) and 
cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify it). We end direct 
violence by changing conflict behaviours, structural violence by removing structural 
contradictions and injustices, and cultural violence by changing attitudes. 
 
Mark Duffield correctly recognises that what is claimed in the theory may run some 
way in advance of what happens on the ground. This is, of course, true of most forms 
of social theory. Both at the level of theory and of practice conflict resolution has for 
some time been concerned with appropriate forms of support and intervention, and 
with enabling and empowering a legitimate discourse and practice around the project 
of sustainability of peacebuilding. Of course it is not easy to do this in practice and it 
has never been a claim of  those in the conflict resolution field that bitter and violent 
conflicts can be overcome by reading books on conflict theory. However, in all 
conflicts there are people who do wish to find ways out of the violence. The role of 
academic conflict resolution is to help them to understand how to do this.  These 
issues are considered below. 
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5. Restoring peace with justice.  
Peacebuilding from Below: Beyond the Western Model 
 
In the past few  years the field of conflict resolution has come under scrutiny from 
ideas generated by the literature of critical social theory, and from  more pragmatic 
policy based concerns coming from field workers in both the UN system and in 
humanitarian agencies of various kinds. In particular exponents working within the 
tradition of conflict resolution wished, as practitioner-scholars, to strengthen its 
concepts and practices, and learned from experiences and perspectives coming from 
diverse fields such as participatory community development, non-violent peace 
advocacy groups and grass roots peace action campaigns. There has also been an 
enriching discourse with academic fields such as anthropology and development 
analysis.  
 
The revision of thinking resulting from this has led to clearer understanding in three 
areas. Firstly, in the  recognition that embedded cultures and economies of violence 
provide more formidable barriers to constructive intervention than originally assumed 
by the earlier research of conflict theory. In these conflicts ‘simple’ one dimensional 
interventions, whether by traditional mediators aiming at formal peace agreements, or 
by peacekeepers placed to supervise cease-fires or oversee elections, are unlikely to 
produce comprehensive or lasting resolution.  Secondly, in the specification of the 
significance of post-conflict peacebuilding and of the idea that formal agreements 
need to be underpinned by understandings, structures and long-term development 
frameworks that will erode cultures of violence and sustain peace processes on the 
ground. Thirdly, in the related idea of  the significance of local actors and of the 
importance of local knowledge and wisdom.  
 
These shifts in thinking, which have given greater recognition to peacebuilding from 
below, can be illustrated in the work of two scholar-practitioners, Adam Curle, and 
John Paul Lederach. Throughout his academic career, (which ended formally in 1978 
when he retired from the Chair of Peace Studies at the University of  Bradford),  and 
also through the period of his ‘retirement’,  Curle, a Quaker,  has been deeply 
involved in the practice of peacemaking .  In the 1990s much of this involvement took 
the form of   supporting the activity of the Osijek Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and 
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Human Rights. Osijek a city in Eastern Slavonia, was, with the adjacent town of 
Vukovar, the site of the most violent fighting of the Serb Croat War.  This 
involvement with the people of Osijek, who were trying to rebuild a tolerant society 
while surrounded by the enraged and embittered feelings caused by the war,  caused a 
considerable amount of  reflection by Curle  about the problems of practical 
peacemaking.  It was apparent, for example, that the model of mediation specified in 
his earlier book on mediation (In the Middle) and distilled from his experiences in the 
conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s, was very difficult to apply  on the ground in the 
confusion and chaos of the type of conflict epitomised by the  wars in former 
Yugoslavia.   It was still the case that the use of mediatory techniques would be much 
more likely to produce the shift in attitudes and understanding necessary for a stable 
peace, a resolution of conflict, than the use of conventional diplomacy alone:  
“solutions reached through negotiation may be simply expedient and not imply any 
change of heart. And this is the crux of peace. There must be a change of heart. 
Without this no settlement can be considered secure.”  However, Curle  realised 
through his involvement with the Osijek project that the range of conflict traumas and 
problems were so vast that the model of mediation based on the intervention of 
outsider-neutrals was simply not powerful or relevant enough to promote peace.  He  
made two important revisions to his peace praxis.  Firstly: 
Since conflict resolution by outside bodies and individuals has so far proved 
ineffective [in the chaotic conditions of contemporary ethnic conflict - 
particularly, but not exclusively, in Somalia, Eastern Europe and the former 
USSR], it is essential to consider the peacemaking potential within the 
conflicting communities themselves. (Curle, 1994,  p.  96) 
 
Curle now sees the role of conflict resolution in post-Cold War conflicts as providing 
a variety of support to local peacemakers through an advisory, consultative-facilitative 
role which offers workshops, training and support in a wide variety of potential fields 
which the local  groups might identify as necessary. The task is to empower people of 
goodwill in conflict-affected communities to rebuild democratic institutions, and the 
starting point for this to help in “the development of the local peacemakers inner 
resources of wisdom, courage and compassionate non-violence”. (Curle, 1994, p. 
104).  
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Secondly, Curle recognises an important role for the UN in this process of 
empowerment and in this sense recognises the need to make connections between the 
official mandates of the UN agencies, including peacekeeping, and the unofficial roles 
of the NGOs in conflict zones.  The approach of Curle has been to transform his 
original idea of active mediation as an outsider intervention into an empowering 
approach which is much more context sensitive. Curle’s approach may still be an 
example of the socio-psychological model which Duffield as identified.  However 
Curle sees the model as a starting point for a conflict resolution process, not the 
totality of that process, or its end point. The project is concerned with the objectives 
of transforming behaviours, attitudes, and structures. This may be illustrated in the the 
work of two other peace researchers/conflict resolvers, Caroline Nordstrom and John 
Paul Lederach. 
 
Following field research in Mozambique and Sri Lanka, Nordstrom explained the 
many stories of absurd destruction and the use of terror in warfare as deliberate efforts 
to destroy the normal meanings that define and guide daily life (Nordstrom, 1992, 
269). This is the process whereby dirty war becomes the means through which 
economies of violence merge with what Nordstrom calls 'cultures of violence'. As she 
puts it, ‘violence parallels power’ and people come to have no alternative but to 
accept ‘fundamental knowledge constructs that are based on force’ (Nordstrom, 1992, 
269). Nordstrom argues that there is a 'need to create a counter-life-world construct to 
challenge the politico-military one'. Obviously, it is very difficult for civilians wishing 
to seek an alternative to 'the dirty war paradigm as a survival mechanism’ to find one 
in the vicious and dangerous environment of an active war zone (Nordstrom, 1992, 
270). Nevertheless, there are innumerable examples of resistance to the ‘rationality’ 
and ‘culture’ of the war zone to set beside the otherwise overwhelming catalogue of 
brutalisation and atrocity. These are the usually unsung heroes of conflict resolution 
and peace-making in the midst of violence, often at great personal risk. In Burundi’s 
capital, Bujumbura, for example, residents in two neighbourhoods, one Hutu and one 
Tutsi, formed a mixed committee of 55 men and women to try to protect each other 
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from attack. In Colombia there has been the growth of ‘communities of peace', many 
of them developed by Colombia’s indigenous Indians, declaring themselves neutral in 
the fighting between the military and guerillas. Many have been killed for taking this 
position, but they persist with the help of an organisation, the Antioquia Indigenous 
Organisation, supported by Oxfam, to help provide food, shelter and medecine, and to 
publicise their situation. In Liberia some communities have formed community watch 
teams to protect themselves against armed groups which threaten their communities 
(Cairns, 1997, 85-86).  
 
In many of these community responses women  are often the main creators of new 
modes of survival and conflict resolution, usually at local level and nearly always 
unrecorded. This is, for obvious reasons, much more difficult to chronicle - as also in 
the case of male victims and unsung peace-makers. Attempts have been made to 
compare the effectiveness of men and women as mediators with mixed results 
(Maxwell and Maxwell, 1989; Dewhurst, 1991; Stamato, 1992). Some see Track I 
conflict resolution approaches based on diplomacy and military power as male-
dominated, and Track II citizen peace-making as associated more with women 
(Stiehm, 1995). A number of social anthropological studies of peace-making practices 
in different parts of the world have emphasised the key role played by women 
(Duffey, 1998).  
 
The question has also been asked as to whether the discourses and institutions that 
reproduce militarism and violence are themselves gendered so that successful long-
term conflict resolution requires a radical transformation here as well (Taylor and 
Miller, 1994). Duffey (1998) has pointed out that the involvement of women in formal 
peace processes and negotiations has been very limited, and that they are largely 
excluded from high-level negotiations despite their active participation in local peace 
movements and peace-making initiatives. The exclusion of women from the discourse 
about new political structures defined in peace agreements, and the political process of 
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negotiations determined at international level, may well be factors which perpetuate 
the exclusionist and violent discourses and institutions which contribute to the conflict 
in the first place. Byrne has noted that, despite the many local organizations which 
represented women's interests in former Yugoslavia, there were no women 
representatives involved in the Dayton peace talks in 1995 (Byrne, 1996). Similarly, 
Duffey has demonstrated that the exclusion of women from the UN sponsored peace 
conferences in Somalia served to increase the legitimacy and power of the warlords, 
who were frequently unaccountable to the local community. When women are 
excluded from contributing to peace negotiations, the realities of a conflict in terms of 
its impact on communities may not be fully comprehended. For this reason, Berhane-
Selassie (1994) argues that the international community should consult and involve 
women in order to understand more about the root causes of conflict, to understand 
how obstacles to peace processes can be removed, and to gain insight about how 
traditional practices can offer alternative ways of ending conflicts. 
In its recently published Code of Conduct, the NGO International Alert identified ten 
principles which guided its work in conflict resolution, one of which recognised and 
supported ‘the distinctive peacemaking role of women in societies affected by violent 
conflict’ (International Alert, 1999, p.4) 
 
 
John Paul Lederach, working as a scholar-practitioner and within a Mennonite 
tradition which shares many of the values and ideas of the Quakers, and with practical 
experience in Central America, has also stressed the importance of this approach, 
which he calls indigenous empowerment. Thus,  
The principle of indigenous empowerment suggests that conflict 
transformation must actively envision, include, respect, and promote the 
human and cultural resources from within a given setting. This involves a new 
set of lenses through which we do not primarily ‘see’ the setting and the 
people in it as the ‘problem’ and the outsider as the ‘answer’. Rather, we 
understand the long-term goal of transformation as validating and building on 
people and resources within the setting.  (Lederach 1995 p. 212) 
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The approach also suggests that it is important to identify the “cultural modalities and 
resources” within the setting of the conflict in order to evolve a comprehensive 
framework which embodies both short-term and long-term perspectives for conflict 
transformation.  The importance of  cultural relevance and sensitivity within conflict 
resolution theory has emerged partly in response to learning from case experience, and 
partly as an explicit critique of  earlier forms of conflict resolution theory where local 
culture was given marginal significance.  In the former case, both Lederach and Wehr, 
reflecting on their work in Central America found that the ‘western’ model of outsider 
neutral mediators was not understood or trusted in many Central American settings, 
while the idea of insider partial peacemaking was.  In the case of  critiques of John 
Burton’s universal theory, Kevin Avruch and Peter Black, drawing on perspectives 
from anthropology,  have argued for greater recognition of the issue of culture in the 
theory and practice of conflict resolution.  They suggest that ethnoconflict theories 
(derived from locally constructed common sense views of conflict) and ethnopraxis 
(techniques and customs for dealing with conflict derived from these understandings) 
need to be developed and incorporated into the construction of general theory.  What 
has emerged then is the recognition of a need for what Lederach has called a 
comprehensive approach to conflict resolution which is attentive to how short term 
intervention which aims to halt violence is integrated with long term resolution 
processes. This long-term strategy will be sustainable if outsiders/experts support and 
nurture rather than displace resources which can form part of a peace constituency and 
if the strategy addresses all levels of an affected population.   
 
Lederach’s comprehensive approach entails building what he refers to as an 
infrastructure for peace involving all of the affected population.  He describes  the 
affected population as a triangle, with the key military and political leaders at the 
apex, at level one. In the middle, at level two, are the national leaders who have 
significance as leaders in sectors such as health, education and within the military 
hierarchies.  Finally, at the grassroots level, level three, are the vast majority of the 
affected population: the common people, displaced and refugee populations, local 
leaders, elders, church groups and locally based NGOs.  At this level also, the armed 
combatants are represented as guerrillas and soldiers in militias.  Most peacemaking at 
the level of international diplomacy operates at level one of this triangle, but for 
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conflict resolution to be successful and sustainable then the co-ordination of 
peacemaking strategies across all three levels must be undertaken.  In this new 
thinking,  peacebuilding from below is of decisive importance for it is the means by 
which, according to Lederach, a peace constituency can be built within the setting of 
the conflict itself.  Once again this is a departure from conventional practice where 
peacemaking resources from outside the conflict (diplomats, third party intervenors 





In this response I do not wish to claim that conflict resolution is a problem-free area of 
enquiry and practice. The challenges posed by our three critics are valid, helpful and 
challenging. My argument is that none of the critics have seriously engaged with the 
literature on the theory and practice of conflict resolution.  While it does not claim to 
be universally effective,  the field is more robust and self-questioning than many of its  
critics recognise.  Further, there is a literature and a practice of conflict resolution and 
its cognate field of peace research spanning over forty years which is hardly touched 
upon by any of our three critics.  The literature on third party mediation is well 
developed. The emerging policy on the doctrinal and operational links between 
peacekeeping conflict resolution indicates a potential to deal with issues of the 
security of  people in conflict zones. Finally, in applying a peacebuilding from below 
approach the way in which a conflict is viewed is transformed, thus engaging with 
concerns about inappropriate intevention raised by our critics. Whereas normally 
people within the conflict are seen as the problem, with outsiders providing the 
solution to the conflict, in the perspective of peacebuilding from below solutions are 
derived and built from local resources. (International Alert, 1999:  Goodhand and 
Lewer, 1998:  Goodhand and Hume 1998). Commenting on the many examples the of 
local level cross-community peace-building work in Eastern Coatia as a complement 
to 1995 political-constitutional level settlement, Judith Large concludes that, although 
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it is easy for outside critics to be dismissive of these small-scale and usually 
unpublicised initiatives, this is not how things look from the inside. Here it is the 
practical transformative work of all those who oppose the 'discourses of violence'  that 
is cumulatvely crucial: 'for activists inside, it mattered too much not to try' (1997, 4). 
This represents what Betts Fetherston (1998) calls anti-hegemonic, counter-
hegemonic and post-hegemonic peace-building projects, and what Caroline 
Nordstrom refers to as 'counter-lifeworld constructs' that challenge the cultures of 
violence (1992, 270). In endorsing Large's conclusion, and applying it to the variety of 
indigenous peace-building enterprises that go on all over the world (European 
Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1998),  Edmund Burke's 
dictum: 'it is only necessary for the good man to do nothing for evil to triumph', comes 
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